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Production Licensing on the UK Continental Shelf: 
Ministerial Powers and Controls 
Greg W. Gordon 
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the conditions present in the oil production 
licenses granted for work on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
(UKCS) from the perspective of the powers given to the state in order to 
influence or control operational matters—a perspective of particular 
importance at the moment. Since Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
governments of the 1970s and 1980s implemented the progressive phasing 
out of direct state participation in the British oil business, the United 
Kingdom’s approach has been one of “light-handed” regulation.1 This 
model places the state in the largely passive role of a permitting authority 
assessing specific proposals brought to it by the licensees of particular 
blocks. Assumption of that role does not imply that the state and the 
industry have not at times worked collaboratively in the development of 
strategy, nor does it mean that the state hasn’t pursued policies or 
objectives—for a long time, the state has publicly avowed an interest in 
maintaining the UKCS as a productive petroleum province for as long as 
possible.2 But the state has not proactively set the agenda for particular 
developments or assertively “bossed” the industry by requiring it, for 
example, to develop particular areas collaboratively through the use of a 
hub strategy. The Wood Review now proposes a change in strategy, with 
the government taking a much more hands-on role in the development and 
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environmental liability for releases of oil from offshore installments. 
 1. See generally Sean Rush, Access to Infrastructure on the UKCS: The Past, 
the Present and a Future, MEMERY CRYSTAL LLP (2012), http://www.meme 
rycrystal.com/uploaded/Articles/other%20files/Access%20to%20Infrastructure%20
on%20the%20UKCS%20-%20SR%20-%20Feb%202012.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/RS6F-8GCL] (the term is used in relation to the Minister’s regulation of third party 
access to infrastructure, but it is apt to describe the Minister’s approach more 
generally). 
 2. See, e.g., PILOT Progressing Partnership Working Group, infra note 34 
and accompanying text. 
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regulation of the UKCS.3 The intention is to move beyond the individual, 
field-specific mindset into one that looks at the UKCS more holistically. 
The task of considering what new powers might be required to implement 
the Wood Review’s proposal should surely begin with a close 
consideration of the powers that are already possessed, but this matter has 
hitherto received limited attention.4 This paper intends to address that 
omission, providing an overview of UKCS licensing in Part I and then 
delving into the specific terms and conditions of UKCS licenses in Part II. 
This exploration will show that the government is faced with a different 
set of challenges now as compared to those addressed in the early pioneer 
days when the current rules were created and that adaptation is imperative 
to progress. 
I. LICENSING ON THE UKCS 
A. The License: Historical Development and Character 
The offshore British oil and gas production license is a curious 
creature. The offshore licensing system was hastily created by a 
government which had little experience with onshore oil and gas activity.5 
At times the system exhibits eccentricities that hint at a troubled past, but 
some of its oddities are no more than harmless quirks. One example of the 
latter is the ineptly named “production license,” which is granted many 
years before production will commence and, in addition to production, 
governs most exploratory drillings and appraisal activities.6 Other 
                                                                                                             
 3. See generally Sir Ian Wood, UKCS Maximising Recovery Review: Final 
Report, WOOD REVIEW, (2014), http://www.woodreview.co.uk/documents/UKCS 
%20Maximising%20Recovery%20Review%20FINAL%2072pp%20locked.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Call For Views On How To Implement The Wood Review 
Recommendations To Maximise Economic Recovery Of The UK Continental 
Shelf, DEP’T OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, 20 (November 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3
71357/20141105_WR_autumn_document-draft_-_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/428S-N4UZ]. There the Department noted that the process of considering what 
new powers would be required would be carried out “[i] n parallel with . . . a 
review of the existing powers.” The Department has not yet published the results 
of any review of existing powers, but the proposed new powers have been 
published in draft in the Energy Bill 2015-16, available for download from 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/energy/documents.html [http://perma 
.cc /6694-B9E3]. 
 5. T. Daintith, et al., United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law, paras. 1-105–1-06 
(3rd ed. 2010). 
 6. A non-exclusive exploration license also exists. Holders of such 
licenses—who may be oil and gas companies or commercial seismic 
contractors—receive the right—along with all other holders of such licenses—to 
shoot seismic and conduct other specified exploration activities anywhere within 
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peculiarities, such as the legal nature of the license, are more significant. 
Clearly, the license is not a lease; it is not drafted as such, and, in any 
event, a lease would not be appropriate under these circumstances. 
Contrary to the position onshore and within the territorial sea,7 the state 
does not purport to own either the Continental Shelf or the oil and gas in 
strata beneath it; instead, the state only purports to exercise “sovereign 
rights” relative to the oil and gas.8 But if it is easy to see that a license is 
not a lease, it is more difficult to determine precisely what it is.9 The 
license has both regulatory and contractual aspects,10 but the courts have 
not yet been called upon to determine whether it is a true legal chimera—
simultaneously both a regulatory instrument and a contract—or an 
essentially regulatory instrument in the form of a contract. This important 
matter bears on a variety of issues, including the range of remedies that 
may be available in the event of breach.11 One significant consequence 
arising from the contractual aspect of the license is that it incorporates the 
current Model Clauses at the time of its grant to provide its terms and 
conditions.12 This characteristic makes it impossible, in the absence of 
mutual agreement or retroactive legislation,13 for the state to alter the terms 
                                                                                                             
the territorial sea or UKCS, subject to a number of conditions, currently stipulated 
in the Schedule to The Offshore Exploration (Petroleum, and Gas Storage and 
Unloading) (Model Clauses) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2814). The licensee may 
only enter any area that is already subject to a production license with that license–
holder’s consent and may not carry out operations so as to interfere unjustifiably 
with navigation or fishing or with the conservation of the living resources of the 
sea. This paper will focus upon the production license. 
 7. This position is also contrary to the position that is taken in relation to the 
exploitation of the Continental Shelf in other contexts. A person wishing to 
develop an offshore windfarm upon the Continental Shelf must obtain both a 
license from the regulator and a lease from the Crown Estate, who—in this 
context—seek to exercise what seem to be rights of ownership over the UKCS. 
 8. United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2.1, Jun. 10, 
1964, 7302 U.N.T.S. 499 (the same right conferred upon the state by international 
law); See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 77, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 9. See, e.g., the discussion in Daintith, supra note 5, para 1-323. 
 10. The form is contractual, insofar as both parties sign it and consideration 
passes, but the effect is regulatory insofar as it one-sidedly imposes obligations 
on the licensee while conferring a range of powers on the relevant government 
Minister. 
 11. See discussion infra Part. I.C. 
 12. The principal conditions which the Minister imposes on licensees are to 
be found in Model Clauses which section 4(1)(e) of the Petroleum Act 1998 
provides shall be prescribed by Regulation incorporated into all petroleum 
licenses. 
 13. Retroactive legislation is rare, but for a striking example see discussion infra 
Part I.D; See also Greg Gordon, Petroleum Licensing, in OIL AND GAS LAW: 
CURRENT ISSUES AND EMERGING TRENDS 65 (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
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of an individual license,14 a factor that has acted as a barrier to across-the-
board reform and added considerably to the complexity of the system.15 In 
this regard, the UKCS’s upstream licensing regime lacks the flexibility 
inherent in some other systems which use a purely administrative licensing 
model.16 
B. Licensing and Regulation on the UKCS 
Before considering the license conditions in detail, it is worth 
outlining some of the essential features of the production license and the 
broader system of governance of which it forms a part. 
In the United Kingdom, licenses are not allocated by means of cash 
premium bid, with the highest cash bidder winning the acreage.17 Instead, 
when there is competition for the same acreage, the Minister of State for 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (the Minister) will 
ordinarily grant the license area to the licensee or group of licensees 
proposing to conduct the more onerous work program in the initial term of 
the license. Although the license refers to “licensee” in the singular—a 
convention that shall be followed in this paper—it is common on the 
UKCS, as elsewhere, for the license to be obtained by a group of co-
venturers. As far as the state is concerned, these co-venturers will be 
jointly and severally liable for any breaches of license conditions.18 
                                                                                                             
 14. Oil and Gas Petroleum Licensing Guidance, OIL AND GAS AUTHORITY, 
https://www.gov.uk/oil-and-gas-petroleum-licensing-guidance#legislative-back 
ground [https://perma.cc/5KVH-NL76] (last updated Jan. 28, 2015) (DECC’s 
Guidance recognizes that “Model Clauses attached to existing licenses are not affected 
by the issue of subsequent sets of Model Clauses, except through specifically 
retrospective measures.”). 
 15. There have been many occasions when changes have been made to the 
Model Clauses in order to address a particular problem. In the absence of rarely 
seen, and politically difficult primary legislation having retroactive effect, these 
changes will take effect only for licenses granted after the Model Clauses have 
been changed. This leaves many “historic legacy” licenses continuing to run, often 
for years after the issue was identified, in which the problem is not resolved. See 
infra part II.A. 
 16. Retrospective change is possible in, for instance, the Norwegian system, 
at least for some types of condition: Daintith, supra note 5, para 1-323. 
 17. Some particularly promising acreage in the fourth, eighth and ninth 
rounds were offered in this way, but the sums raised were disappointing and the 
United Kingdom did not preserve with this method. See Oil And Gas: licensing 
rounds, OIL & GAS AUTHORITY (Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/oil-and-gas-
licensing-rounds [https://perma.cc/9BYY-E9CM], for the table available under 
the heading “Past Licensing Rounds.” 
 18. The Petroleum Licensing (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 
2008, S.I. 2008/225, art. 1, ¶ 2 (U.K.) (“Any obligations which are to be observed 
and performed by the Licensee shall at any time at which the Licensee is more 
than one person be joint and several obligations.”). 
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However, as between themselves, the co-venturers will use the Joint 
Operating Agreement (JOA) pertaining to the licensed area as a means of 
apportioning their liabilities, generally in accordance with each party’s 
percentage interest in the asset.19  
The production license is the means by which exclusive rights to 
“search and bore for and get”20 petroleum within a certain area is given to 
the licensee. As noted, supra, the state claims rights in relation to oil and 
gas in its natural condition in strata, and hitherto the license has been 
granted by the Minister.21 While formal disputes between the Minister and 
licensees have been rare, the license stipulates arbitration as the means of 
resolving disputes that do arise, except where they relate to a matter 
“determined, decided, directed, approved or consented” by the Minister. 
The latter category of disputes—all of which could be characterized as 
disagreements about the manner in which the Minister has exercised his 
administrative function—may not be arbitrated. However, such matters 
would seem to be susceptible to judicial review before the courts. 
C. The Licensee’s Duties and Sanctions for Breach 
Prior to obtaining a license, the licensee must show to the Minister’s 
satisfaction that it has the financial and technical capability to undertake 
both the operations in contemplation and any environmental remediation 
measures that may be required in the event that such operations go wrong. 
A company that fails to carry out work that it has undertaken to conduct 
in its initial work program, such as the drilling of exploration wells, will 
have its license brought to an end at the initial period, unless the failure 
has occurred for good reason. Beyond that result, it would seem that the 
                                                                                                             
 19. See Scott Styles, Joint Operating Agreements, in OIL AND GAS LAW: 
CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS 359 (Greg Gordon, et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2011). 
 20. Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 36 (Eng.); 
Petroleum Act, 1998, c. 17, § 3(1) (U.K.) (this wording, which appeared in the 
Petroleum (Production) Act and was repeated in the Petroleum Act, is mirrored in 
the Model Clause entitled “Grant of License”; currently Model Clause 2). 
 21. The particular department responsible for licensing has changed 
repeatedly over the last twenty years or so. At various points, this function has 
been exercised by the Department of Energy, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. At 
the time of writing (May 2015), some administrative functions are in the process 
of being transferred to the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA), a new, industry-funded 
regulator established in partial implementation of the reforms recommended in 
the Wood Review. As the precise detail of the relationship between the OGA and 
DECC has yet to be determined, reference throughout this piece will continue to 
be made to the Minister, although it may well be that many of the functions 
discussed will shortly come to be undertaken by the OGA. 
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licensee will suffer no immediate penalty—the Minister will not have 
sought a deposit or performance bond as security against the undertaking 
of the work in advance, despite the fact that the state stands to suffer 
adverse consequences if the promised works are not timely carried out.22 
The contractual aspect of the license would suggest that an action could 
conceivably lie in the law of contract in the event of such breach.23 
However, it has not been the Minister’s practice to seek damages in such 
instances. Beyond revocation of the license for breach, the only “remedy” 
which the state asserts is the legal right to discriminate in the future 
allocation of petroleum licenses against any applicant who has previously 
shown “a lack of efficiency and responsibility” in operations under a prior 
license.24 Historically, this consequence has been seen as a powerful 
incentive to comply with Ministerial requests and meet license 
obligations,25 and it may continue to be an inducement for at least some 
industry players. But as the UKCS becomes more mature, the licensees 
active within the province increase in number and become more diverse. 
It cannot be assumed that all oil companies currently active within the 
province will be interested in acquiring new licenses; some may be happy 
to produce from existing assets and then exit the UKCS. Some may also 
take the view that—with the majors realigning their asset base on the 
UKCS and becoming increasingly disinterested in obtaining new assets, at 
least within the mature areas of the province—threats by the British 
government are not credible; it may be grateful to secure such investment 
as it is offered. 
Other license breaches raise similar problems. Revoking a license 
would appear to be a wholly disproportionate response to, for instance, a 
licensee inadvertently neglecting to appoint a fisheries liaison officer for 
a short period of time after the person previously holding that role left the 
                                                                                                             
 22. A failure to timeously carry out work will have the effect of delaying the 
time when potentially useful field data will be provided to the Minister and 
deferring, perhaps by years, if the license is revoked and the acreage recycled 
through a future licensing round, the point when production—and tax revenue on 
the profits thereof—will commence. 
 23. See Greg Gordon, Oil, Water and Law Don't Mix: Environmental 
Liability For Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the UK: Part 1: Liability In The 
Law Of Tort/Delict and Under the Petroleum License, 25 EVTL. L. & MGMT. 3, 
10 (2013), for further information. 
 24. This rule was initially part of domestic law but later confirmed at 
European Union level. See Council Directive 94/22, Conditions for Granting and 
Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of 
Hydrocarbons, 1994 O.J. (L 164) (EC). 
 25. See Greg Gordon & John Paterson, Mature Province Initiatives, in OIL 
AND GAS LAW: CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS 128–29 (Greg 
Gordon, et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
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licensee’s employment.26 Even if the Minister were minded to pursue such 
a matter under contract, he would seem to have no prospect of success, as 
he would not be able to demonstrate that he had suffered a loss as a result 
of the breach. 
According to the government, the absence of a gradated scheme of 
sanctions for breaches of license conditions poses a potential problem in 
the context of implementation of the Wood Review. The government has 
consulted on the possibility of introducing an improvement notice and 
financial penalty system to assist the new Oil and Gas Authority in 
implementing its strategy to maximize overall economic recovery of oil 
and gas from the UKCS. It has also stated its intention to introduce a 
graduated sanctions system to that further that end.27 
II. LICENSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
Having introduced the framework and setting within which license 
conditions operate, the time has come to examine the conditions 
themselves. This article primarily focuses on the license conditions that 
directly or indirectly provide the Minister with some degree of control or 
influence over operations. 
A. Term Structure and Relinquishment 
The term structure and relinquishment provisions particularly 
weakened the first generation of British production licenses. These 
licenses, granted in the first four licensing rounds between 1964 and 1972, 
pertained to some of the most prospective areas of the UKCS. However, 
at the time, only two terms comprised the license: an initial term of six 
years and a production period of forty years. The license contained limited 
relinquishment provisions and, as we shall see below, little in the way of 
other provisions that would allow the government to proactively force the 
pace of development. Instead, the state was cast in a more passive role, 
restricted to approving or rejecting specific proposals submitted by the oil 
companies. This approach was rooted in the belief that the industry’s own 
commercial self-interest would lead to timely and efficient exploitation of 
assets. As Daintith has observed, “the idea that licensees might make 
significant discoveries but then not develop them does not appear to have 
                                                                                                             
 26. This obligation is contained in Model Clause 45. 
 27. Implementing the Wood Review Recommendations, DEP’T OF ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE, 20–23 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads 
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414444/Call_for_Evidence_Govt_Response-
FINAL_120315.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADZ9-8GKG]. See Energy Bill, 2015-16, 
H.L. Bill [62] cl. 41 (Gr. Brit.). 
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occurred to those who first drafted the offshore licensing arrangements.”28 
This fact is hardly surprising—such behavior would at first sight seem to 
be counter-intuitive. But in fact there are a number of reasons why an oil 
company might choose not to develop particular discoveries. Oil 
companies need access to oil—not just for development in the here and 
now, but for the purposes of forward planning. Not all of a company’s 
portfolio of assets can be developed simultaneously, and acreage in a 
geopolitically stable state—as the United Kingdom has historically been 
perceived to be29—is perhaps more likely to be obtained but not 
immediately developed as compared to acreage in less stable provinces, 
where the need to press on with production quickly might seem to be more 
urgent. 
The design of the system of direct state take from oil and gas 
operations also rendered the UKCS unusually susceptible to this sort of 
behavior. As has already been noted, no cash premium is paid in order to 
obtain the license,30 and area rentals are low, particularly in the early years 
of the license. State take initially took the form of a royalty and taxation 
of the profits of production—both of which, of course, are payable only 
when the development enters into the production phase. The UKCS is, 
therefore, a relatively cheap province in which to “stockpile” acreage. If 
the fiscal system does not effectively discourage such behavior, then the 
term structure and relinquishment obligations contained in the license take 
on a particular importance. 
Between 1972 and 2002, the Government experimented with various 
term structures, offering up a variety of two-,31 three-32 and even four-term 
                                                                                                             
 28. Terence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and 
Gas – A Comparative Study, 4 OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 176, para 4104 (2006). 
 29. In fiscal terms, it has been particularly unstable, with tax rates changing 
frequently, sometimes with no or no adequate consultation with the industry. See, 
e.g., Emre Üşenmez, The UKCS Fiscal Regime, in OIL AND GAS LAW: CURRENT 
PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS 137 (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
 30. The rationale for this is that demanding cash upfront diverts to the state 
money that would otherwise be used for exploration and production activities. 
There is logic in this, but if such payments are being made in other jurisdictions, 
a company may well be inclined to prioritize the development of the assets that it 
has already paid good money for than those that it obtained without up-front 
capital investment. That said, the amounts raised when this method was utilized 
in the fourth, eighth and ninth rounds were not considered sufficient to justify an 
ongoing use of this method. 
 31. See OIL & GAS AUTHORITY, supra note 17 (for a useful summary of the 
position.) The seventh to tenth offshore rounds were offered with a six-year initial 
period and 30-year production period. 
 32. Licenses granted in the fifth and sixth rounds, for instance, had an initial 
term of four years, a second term of three years and a production period of 30 
years. Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, S.I. 1976/1129 (U.K.). There 
was no relinquishment requirement until the expiry of the second term, at which 
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licenses33 with a number of different acreage surrender provisions. 
However, none of these models were entirely satisfactory. In the early 
2000s, the joint industry and government organization PILOT Progressing 
Partnership Working Group (PILOT PPWG) assessed the state of the 
regulatory regime in the UKCS, concluding that lengthy initial and second 
terms and lax relinquishment requirements were among the factors 
contributing to “an environment where there is too little pressure on 
licensees to deliver value from their licenses” and in which “decisions on 
marginal or high-risk economic activities, or divestment [could] be 
repeatedly deferred.”34 PILOT PPWG’s recommendations35 led to the 
introduction, in 2002, of the three-term structure used in standard 
production licenses today.36 
The current production license commences with a four-year initial 
term during which the licensee must complete the work program it 
promised to undertake in its application. The activities described in the 
work program will vary from license to license, but are essentially 
concerned with exploration and appraisal.37 The licensee must also 
surrender no less than one half of the licensed area back to the government. 
There is no strict obligation upon the licensee to carry out a full and 
comprehensive survey and appraisal of its block, but the surrender 
requirement is intended as an indirect incentive for the licensee to learn as 
much as possible about the block before the end of the initial term—a 
                                                                                                             
point no less than two-thirds of the initially-licensed area had to be surrendered. 
Id. Licenses granted in the eleventh and twelfth rounds, by contrast, under the 
Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations, 1988 had an initial term of 
six years, a second term of 12 years and a production period of 18 years. 
Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988, S.I. 1988/1213 
(U.K.). The licensee was obliged to relinquish one-half of the license at the end 
of the initial period; there were no further relinquishment provisions. Id. 
 33. Licenses granted in the seventeenth round for instance, had an initial term 
of three years, a second term of six years, a third term of 15 years and a production 
period of 24 years: 1988 Model Clauses, as amended by The Petroleum 
(Production) (Seaward Areas)(Amendment) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2946) 
Reg 8. The amount of acreage that the licensee was required to relinquish varied 
depending on the amount of exploration work undertaken; the more wells drilled, 
the more acreage could be retained. 
 34. The Work of the Progressing Partnership Work Group, PILOT PROGRESSING 
PARTNERSHIP WORKING GROUP 2002, 7, available at http://webarchive.national 
archives.gov.uk/20101227132010/http:/www.pilottaskforce.co.uk/files/workgroup/4
22.doc (Other factors identified were the lack of exploration obligations beyond the 
initial license term and low area rentals. See id. at 8). 
 35. Id. at 9. 
 36. See OIL & GAS AUTHORITY, supra note 14. 
 37. Companies may, for instance, make a firm commitment to drill a certain 
number of wells, or make the undertaking to drill contingent upon the results of a 
specified form of seismic survey. 
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company would not wish to retain the “wrong half” of the block as a result 
of ignorance as to which part had greater prospective potential. 
The second term of the standard production license also lasts for four 
years. The primary purpose of this term is to enable the licensee to 
formulate a field development and production program, which must be 
submitted to the government and approved before the end of the period in 
order for the license to continue into its third term. At the end of the second 
term, the licensee must relinquish all areas of the license not comprising 
the producing part.38 A production period lasting eighteen years will then 
follow. 
Thus, by the time that eight years have elapsed, the licensee will have 
explored and appraised the license area, will have produced a field 
development and a production plan, and will have been required to 
relinquish the overwhelming majority of the area initially granted under 
the license. The holder of a modern production license is therefore placed 
under significantly more pressure to explore and commence production 
than was the case before the new term structure was introduced in 2002. 
However, it should be recognized that many pre-2002 licenses containing 
different term structures continue to be valid39—a factor which contributed 
to the introduction of the Fallow Areas Initiative, discussed further at 
section II.D, below. 
B. Variant License Forms: The Promote License and The Frontier License 
The standard production license is no longer the only production 
license available on the UKCS. Following consultation with industry 
experts, two variations on the standard production license were introduced 
in the early 2000s: the promote license and the frontier license. 
The promote license was introduced to make obtaining licenses easier 
for small companies that may possess considerable geo-technical ability 
but only limited financial resources and technical capacity, to obtain 
licenses.40 These types of companies present the government with both an 
opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity lies in unlocking the 
knowledge and skills held by the individuals who make them up. Many 
such companies are either formed by or employ persons who previously 
held senior positions in more established companies; they are aware of 
                                                                                                             
 38. I.e. the area to which the field development and production program pertains. 
 39. See License Data, DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, https://og.decc 
.gov.uk/information/license_reports/offshorebylicense.html [https://perma.cc/P629-
RUYS] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). All licenses from P1034 backwards pre-date the 
2002 reforms. Around 280 such licenses appear to still be extant, including P1, the 
first production license to be granted on the UKCS. 
 40. See Gordon, supra note 13, for further information. 
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plays that were not taken up by their former employer that the have 
potential for current or future development.41 The government seeks to 
attract such players by offering significant discounts to the usual acreage 
rental.42 
The challenge lies in facilitating the entry of small companies without 
exposing workers, the environment and other industry players to excessive 
risk.43 The dangers inherent in permitting such companies to obtain a 
license are mitigated by the term structure of the license. The initial term 
and its associated work obligation are divided into Parts I and II. Part I 
lasts two years, during which time the work obligation will normally be to 
carry out desk-based work on existing data. During this time, the licensee 
is not required to satisfy the usual technical and financial capability 
requirements—a position which can be justified because the licensee is 
not, at this stage, carrying out physical operations offshore. The technical 
and financial capability requirement does not need to be satisfied until Part 
II of the work program is reached. By this time, the promote licensee needs 
to either acquire the requisite technical and financial capacity itself or—
what is more often the case in practice—to attract a purchaser, or one or 
more co-venturers, possessing that capacity by ensuring that work 
undertaken in Part I of the program is sufficiently complete. If, by either 
of these routes, the licensee succeeds in demonstrating technical and 
financial capability, the license will effectively convert into a standard 
production license. If not, the license will fail at the end of Part I of the 
initial term. 
By comparison, the frontier license was introduced in 2004 and 
restructured in 2008. It was initially designed, again in consultation44 with 
industry leaders, to facilitate the exploration and development of the area 
                                                                                                             
 41. There are many reasons why this might be so. Perhaps the modest scale of 
the development meant that it was not an attractive proposition for a major company, 
but is viable for a smaller player with smaller overheads and different expectations as 
to what constitutes an acceptable rate of return; or perhaps technological advances 
make the play technically feasible now when it previously was not. 
 42. It abates the area rental fee by ninety percent for the first two years of the 
license. 
 43. Workers and the environment could potentially be endangered if 
companies lacking technical capacity were to be granted a license, a fact both by 
the United Kingdom’s government in the design of the promote license and by the 
EU in the provisions relating to capacity contained within the Offshore Safety 
Directive: Directive 2013/30, art. 4, 2013 O.J. (L 178) 66 (EU). Other industry 
players—whether oil companies or contractors—could face an increased chance 
of losses associated with default on the JOA or insolvency events, in the event 
that companies with a weaker financial covenant are permitted to enter the 
marketplace, although arguably this is an ordinary commercial risk against which 
they should take appropriate measures to protect themselves. 
 44. See Gordon, supra note 13, for further information. 
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west of Shetland, which has historically been less attractive to the industry 
due to its deeper water, difficult geology, and lack of infrastructure. The 
license is based on the rationale that oil companies45 will value the opportunity 
to gain exclusive rights to explore relatively large frontier areas, but that they 
will need longer than the standard four years in order to conduct such work. 
Two forms of frontier license now exist: one features a six-year initial term 
followed by a six-year second term and an eighteen-year production period, 
while the other has a nine-year initial term but is otherwise identical to the six-
year variant. The latter form is available only for the Atlantic margin area 
lying to the west of the Outer Hebrides—an area which has hitherto seen 
virtually no investment, and which might be described as the new frontier.46 
For both, area rental charges are significantly abated, but only for the first two 
years of the license. The quid pro quo for these benefits is a significant 
increase in the usual surrender obligation: the licensee must relinquish seven-
eighths of the initial acreage at the end of the initial period. The frontier license 
is therefore granted over a very large area for a reasonably general initial 
period, permitting oil companies exclusivity over a large frontier area. These 
companies will be encouraged to take on these challenges insofar as they are 
allowed to obtain the exclusive right to a very large area, to explore it for a 
longer period and to pay a lower rental than would be the case with a 
traditional license. 
The promote and frontier variants of the production license are generally 
regarded as success stories. Since the variant forms’ introduction, over three 
hundred promote licenses have been awarded, and although the number of 
frontier licenses granted is much lower,47 the acreage granted under these 
licenses is large. As a result, much of the area to the west of Shetland is either 
currently under license or has been licensed and relinquished at least once. 
                                                                                                             
 45. Historically, it is the majors who have shown most interest in the frontier area, 
but independents are now also starting to obtain operatorship in such licenses. For 
instance, Aberdeen-based independent Parkmead obtained frontier acreage West of 
Shetland in West of the Hebrides in the twenty-seventh round. See Mark Williamson, 
Significant Gas Find for Parkmead Group, THE HERALD (Sept. 24, 2014),http://www 
.heraldscotland.com/business/13181667.Significant_gas_find_for_Parkmead_Group 
/ [http://perma.cc/X3PG-JKHX]. 
 46. “Frontier” is in increasingly misleading term to apply to the west of Shetland 
area. Although still under-developed relative to the mature North Sea area, the west 
of Shetland has now seen significant investment. Even a cursory examination of the 
field development map available on DECC’s website discloses that much of the area 
is now licensed and that a network is now beginning to accumulate; See UKCS 
Offshore Infrastructure, Oil & Gas Authority, https://www.gov.uk/government 
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/431078/UKCS_Offshore_Infrastructu
re.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DZD-ACQJ], for a map of the area. The west of Hebrides 
area is highly underdeveloped by comparison. 
 47. 33, by the present author’s calculations. 
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C. Ministerial Power to Extend License Periods 
The production licenses granted in the UKCS’s early licensing rounds 
did not contain any provision expressly empowering the Secretary of State 
to extend such licenses when they reached the end of their term. In 
practice, however, the Secretary of State has been prepared to permit such 
licenses to continue, so long as the field continues to be productive;48 and, 
given the broad discretionary powers conferred upon the Secretary of State 
by the Petroleum Acts, it would seem to be competent for him to extend 
licenses. Thus far, such extensions have generally been granted on a year-
by-year basis by means of the issue of a side-letter to the license. A 
provision expressly empowering the Minister to extend the license beyond 
the end of the initially stipulated production period was not included in the 
Model Clauses until 1988,49 but it has been included without amendment 
in all subsequent sets of Model Clauses.50 The Minister is not obliged to 
offer the extension on the same terms and conditions as existed prior to the 
extension. 
The power is essentially in the form of a renegotiation clause. It states 
that the Minister “may in his discretion agree with the Licensee” that the 
license shall continue in force “for such further period as the Minister and 
the Licensee may agree and subject to such modification of the terms and 
conditions of this license . . . as the Minister and the Licensee may then 
agree is appropriate.”51 Theoretically, this provides the Minister with a 
useful window of opportunity in which to alter the terms on which the 
license is to be held; something he might do in order to facilitate a change 
in policy or to plug any lacunae that may have come to light since the 
original license was granted. This approach, however, has not been 
adopted by the Minister to date. 
It is not just at the end of the license that extra time may be required. 
Factors such as over-runs in exploratory drilling operations may mean that 
the licensee requires extra time at the end of the initial term in order to 
complete the work program, while disagreements between the JOA co-
venturers as to the optimal means of field development could delay the 
preparation of a production plan. Only in 2008 was a provision 
incorporated into the then-current Model Clauses expressly permitting an 
extension to the initial or second term.52 The provision has been repeated 
in all subsequent licensing rounds53 and is markedly different from the one 
                                                                                                             
 48. See OIL AND GAS AUTHORITY, supra note 14. 
 49. Petroleum Regulations 1988, supra note 32, Model cl. 6. 
 50. See, e.g., Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl. 9. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.7. 
 53. I.e., from the 25th round onwards. 
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governing extensions of time at the end of the license’s production period. 
It does not extend the overall life of the license, but instead essentially 
envisages the licensee shifting time from one license term to another—
borrowing from the second term in order to allow it time to complete the 
initial term’s work program, or using up time from the production period 
to allow it to finalize the field development and production plan.54 Neither 
the duration nor the conditions of the extension are a matter available for 
negotiation; the licensee applies for an extension of time and the 
application is determined by the Minister in such a manner as he may, in 
his discretion, see fit.55 For instance, this provision was used to extend the 
deadline for the Field Development Plan in the Fyne field from June 2012 
to August 2014 when, due to a proposed increase in costs, the operator 
decided not to proceed with its initial development concept of using an 
FPSO and sought additional time to work up an alternative program using 
a different production method. In that case, however, further application 
by the field’s operators was rejected, leading to relinquishment of the 
field.56 
Thus, while the United Kingdom license contains no force majeure 
clause, a licensee who suffers a force majeure-type event that prevents it 
from timely carrying out its work program or submitting its field 
development plan would be well advised and entitled to make an 
application for additional time. 57 Indeed, the Fyne case illustrates that, 
although the Minister’s patience is not limitless, Ministerial discretion 
might—at least initially—be exercised in the licensee’s favor in 
circumstances falling short of what would be required to satisfy some force 
majeure provisions. 
D. Ministerial Oversight and Powers to Direct the Licensee’s activities 
The term structure and relinquishment provisions discussed above 
provide the Minister with opportunities to direct and control the licensee 
to some extent. The need to satisfy certain criteria before the license may 
progress from one term to another—in particular the need to satisfy the 
Minister that the work program has been satisfactorily completed and a 
satisfactory field development plan produced—provide obvious 
checkpoints along the road to the development of a particular field. 
                                                                                                             
 54. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.7(6). 
 55. Id. at Model cl. 7(3) & 7(4). 
 56. Fyne Area, ANTRIM ENERGY INC., http://www.antrimenergy.com 
/operations/fyne [http://perma.cc/9EWF-N93A] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
 57. The Model Clause 7 procedure is only available for licenses granted after 
2008, but an appeal to the Minister’s general discretion could potentially be made 
where the situation arose in a license granted prior to that date. 
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However, limits constrain that which can be achieved by a checkpoint 
system. Once the license has passed into the production period, the 
licensee is in the final phase; all of the checkpoints have been passed. So 
if, in the production period, the licensee—while operating the asset in 
accordance with the approved field development and production plan—is 
unwilling or unable to take further steps that would allow it make optimal 
use of its asset,58 the term structure can do nothing to influence the 
licensee’s behavior. In any event, even before the license enters into the 
production period, a model relying solely upon multiple terms and 
relinquishment would provide a fairly unsophisticated system. There may 
be a number of actions, not directly pertaining to the work program or 
feeding into the production of an acceptable field development plan, that 
the Minister would still wish the licensee to take because they are good in 
themselves. 
The question then arises: what other provisions vest in the Minister 
the power to proactively demand that the licensee undertake certain 
operations? Under the licenses granted in the first four licensing rounds, 
the answer is “very little.” Those licenses provided—and still provide—
the Minister with the right to regular returns of information, including 
statements of “all geological work, including surveys and tests, which has 
been carried out and the areas in which and the persons by whom the work 
has been carried out”59 and “any petroleum, water, mines or workable 
seams of coal or other minerals encountered in the course of the said 
operations.”60 This is a valuable provision, but data about operations does 
not equate to power to influence them. The Minister also had—and has—
various powers to approve the licensee’s proposals for key operations; the 
licensee, for instance, cannot drill a well without Ministerial consent.61 
These provisions, too, are valuable, allowing the Minister an opportunity 
to exercise control and oversight of specific, planned operations. However, 
they cast the Minister in a passive role, awaiting the submission of 
documents prior to giving or withholding consent. Model Clause 21, 
entitled “Avoidance of Harmful Methods of Working,” imposed upon the 
                                                                                                             
 58. Perhaps this unwillingness or inability to make optimal use of the asset is 
because there is deadlock in the JOA over whether a particular EOR technique is 
justified, or perhaps simply because the license group cannot access sufficient 
capital to afford the technique. 
 59. The 1966 Model Clauses, MC 29(1)(a); the equivalent right is now 
contained in the 2008 Model Clauses, MC 30(1)(a). Petroleum Regulations 2008, 
supra note 18, Model cl. 30(1)(a). 
 60. The 1966 Model Clauses, MC 29(1)(d); the equivalent right is now 
contained in the 2008 Model Clauses, MC 30(1)(d). Petroleum Regulations 2008, 
supra note 18, Model cl. 3(1)(d). 
 61. The 1966 Model Clauses MC 17; see also Petroleum Regulations 2008, 
supra note 18, Model cl.19. 
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licensee an obligation to “execute all operations in or in connection with 
the licensed area in a proper and workmanlike manner in accordance with 
methods and practice customarily used in good oilfield practice.”62 However, 
any argument that this provision could be used as the foundation for a 
Ministerial right to demand that a licensee undertake particular actions would 
be weak. When seen in the context of its broader setting,63 this provision 
appears to be directed towards the standard by which such operations 
undertaken will be performed—not the strategy dictating which particular 
operations will be undertaken and when. 
So deficient did the Labour Government of 1975 consider the licenses 
to be at preserving the state’s interest in directing operations that it passed 
primary legislation that retroactively introduced a new suite of Model 
Clauses into all licenses then existing.64 The Model Clauses introduced 
provided the Minister with significant rights relative to both exploration 
and production, and they have been included in every license granted 
since.65 
Model Clause 16 pertains to exploration activities. It provides that, not 
only is the licensee obliged during the initial term to undertake the 
activities in the initial work program stipulated at the point of the license’s 
grant, but that the Minister is entitled, at any time before the end of the 
license, to demand that the licensee provide it with an “appropriate work 
program.”66 An appropriate work program is one that would be prepared 
by a licensee seeking to exploit its license rights to the best commercial 
advantage, unconstrained by a lack of either competence or resources. The 
only limitation envisaged is that the program must be one that the licensee 
could reasonably be expected to complete before the end of the license 
period.67 This Clause embodies “an important and powerful provision”68 
that effectively means that the Minister is entitled to demand that the 
                                                                                                             
 62. The 1966 Model Clauses MC 21(1); see also Petroleum Regulations 
2008, supra note 18, Model cl. 23(1). 
 63. The 1966 Model Clauses MC 21 is principally concerned with safety and 
preventing the escape of oil; see also Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, 
Model cl. 23. 
 64. Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, §§ 17−18 (U.K.). This was 
a controversial measure, not least of all as the Government provided no 
compensation, refusing to accept the argument that a license containing this 
somewhat greater level of state control was less commercially valuable than one 
giving the licensee a freer hand. Parliamentary debate was heated; see, eg., 891 
Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1975) cols. 486 & 503; Standing Committee D, Official 
Report, (1974-5), H.C. Vol V, cols. 1106 & 1146−72. 
 65. In discussing these provisions, reference will be made to the numbering 
in the current set of the Model Clauses. See, 2008 Model Clauses. 
 66. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl. 16(2). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Gordon, supra note 13, para 4.46. 
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licensee carry out fresh exploration activities within the licensed area long 
after the initial term of the license. It formed the principal legal 
underpinning to the Fallow Blocks Initiative, one of the principal means 
by which the Minister sought to bring to an end the industry practice of 
accumulating acreage without expeditiously exploring it.69 
Production issues are addressed in Model Clauses 17 and 18. Model 
Clause 18 provides the Minister with a mechanism to place a limit on the 
rate of production from the licensed area. To modern eyes, the focus on 
the Minster’s right to limit production seems peculiar; however, the 
provision was drafted in the pioneering phase of the industry when 
politicians were concerned by the fear that the United Kingdom’s national 
interests would not be well served if international oil companies could 
produce all of the nation’s oil within a very concentrated timeframe.70 
Of greater relevance today is Model Clause 17. This provision forbids 
the licensee from producing oil in contravention of an approved field 
development and production program without first obtaining written 
Ministerial consent. The wording of Model Clause 17 differs markedly 
from that of Model Clause 16, in that the rights it confers on the Minister 
are more tightly circumscribed. The Minister’s grounds for rejecting the 
program are limited to only two possibilities: that the program is contrary 
to good oilfield practice, or that the maximum or minimum production 
level proposed in the program is not in the national interest. This may have 
serious implications for the implementation of the Wood Review’s 
recommendations relative to collaborative working.71 Can the regulator 
refuse to consent to a field development and production plan, when the 
plan is a perfectly sensible means of developing the individual field, but is 
not in conformity with the regulator’s desire to see licensees work together 
collaboratively to maximize overall recovery from the broader 
geographical area of which the field forms part? Is the term good oilfield 
practice specifically elastic to accommodate this? This must be doubted. 
As has already been noted, the term is directed primarily towards safety 
and the prevention of leaks. But assuming it can be extended sufficiently 
far to embrace matters such as efficiency, it is drawn at the level of the 
individual field. And, if what the licensee proposes is a perfectly sensible 
and responsible means of developing its oilfield, it is hard to see how that 
could be refused. If the regulator purported to do so, the refusal would 
                                                                                                             
 69. See Greg Gordon & John Paterson, Mature Province Initiatives, in OIL AND 
GAS LAW: CURRENT ISSUES AND EMERGING TRENDS 111, paras 5.12-.22 (Greg 
Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011), for further discussion of the fallow blocks initiative. 
 70. See ALEX KEMP, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS, 
VOLUME 1: THE GROWING DOMINANCE OF THE STATE 349, 351–52 (Routledge, 
2012). 
 71. Wood, supra note 3, at 12. 
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really be on the basis of what one might term “good and collaborative oil 
province practice,” not “good oilfield practice.” Neither is the production level 
criterion a secure foundation for such a refusal. There may be nothing at all 
wrong with the production level that the licensee proposes; the problem may 
be that a different mode of working, such as a hub development, might permit 
other licensees to produce more, or at lower cost. 
The drafting of Model Clause 17 is also less clearly expressed than 
that of Model Clause 16. The language has shades of the passivity already 
identified as existing elsewhere in the system. As Daintith notes, “the 
drafting of [Model Clause 17] assumes that the licensee, not the Minister, 
initiates the development process, and is not well designed to compel 
development.”72 This contention carries some force: Model Clause 17(2) 
states that it is for the licensee to prepare the program and submit it to the 
Minister. However, the Minister enjoys at least some power to direct the 
licensee—Model Clause 17(2) also provides that the program must be “in 
such form and by such time and in respect of such period during the term 
of this license as the Minister may direct.” Although far less clear than the 
right conferred in Model Clause 16, this provision gives at least some 
grounds for arguing that the Minister is entitled to demand—through the 
issue of a direction—the submission of a program. 
If that is the case, however, a further issue warrants consideration. 
Model Clause 17(3) provides that the Minister may direct the licensee to 
prepare different programs relative to different areas of the license, or 
alternatively that the program cover a particular period in the license only, 
in which case the Minister may issue subsequent directions in relation to 
other time periods. But what if the Minister does not do this, and instead 
approves a generalized program covering the whole of the production area 
for the remaining term of the license, only later coming to realize that the 
approved program is deficient? Model Clause 17(3) would seem to suggest 
that the Minister would, in those circumstances, be barred from demanding 
an updated program. If so, this scenario would seem to seriously curtail 
the usefulness of Model Clause 17 as a means of exercising Ministerial 
control over production. And, given that Model Clause 17 is a major 
element of both the Fallow Discoveries and the Stewardship programs73—
the two principal means by which the Minister presently seeks to improve 
productivity on the UKCS—this result must be a cause for concern. 
                                                                                                             
 72. Daintith, supra note 28, para 4311. 
 73. For a further discussion of these initiatives, see Gordon & Paterson supra 
note 69, paras 5.23–5.49. 
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E. Unitization 
As we have already seen, some aspects of the United Kingdom’s 
offshore licensing regime have changed markedly over time. One feature 
that has remained constant throughout the offshore era is the Minister’s 
right to demand the unitization of reservoirs that lie within more than one 
licensed area.74 
The relevant Model Clause empowers the Minister, at any time when 
the license is in force, to serve a notice upon the licensee, demanding that 
it cooperate with the licensees of the other parts of the shared oilfield.75 
The unitization provision therefore cannot be used as a means of 
compelling hub developments or some of the other species of collaborative 
work envisaged by the Wood Review involving geographical proximity but 
not shared geology.76 But, while a shared field is a necessary condition for 
the Minister’s use of the power, it is not on its own a sufficient condition. 
Before the Minister can serve a notice demanding production of a unit 
development plan, he must also be satisfied that other parts of the “single 
geological petroleum structure or petroleum field”77 lie beneath the areas 
of other production licenses then in force78 and that the field be developed 
by all interested licensees collectively, as a unit as “it is in the national 
interest in order to secure the maximum ultimate recovery of [p]etroleum 
and in order to avoid unnecessary competitive drilling.”79 All parties 
receiving such a notice relative to the same field are obliged to cooperate 
in the creation of a unit development scheme that must be submitted for 
the approval of the Minister.80 If they fail to submit the plan within the 
                                                                                                             
 74. As early as 1917, when the United Kingdom was considering making its 
first, abortive, attempt at establishing an onshore licensing system, the dangers of 
uncontrolled competitive drilling were brought to the government’s attention by 
Lord Cowdray of S. Pearson & Son, who had seen the problems caused by 
competitive drilling while involved in the oil business in the United States: 
Daintith, supra note 5, para 1−103. 
 75. In the 2008 Model Clauses, the relevant clause is MC 27. The equivalent 
Model Clause in earlier licenses is in essentially the same terms. See e.g. The 1966 
Model Clauses, MC 25. 
 76. Wood, supra note 3, at 12. 
 77. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.27(1). 
 78. The Minister is not, however, powerless in the case of a field stretching 
beyond the licensee’s acreage into an unlicensed area. If the Minister is concerned 
that the field development and production program is going to give rise to wasteful 
working practices, he could refuse to grant it on the basis that it is contrary to 
good oilfield practice: see the discussion of MC 17, above. There would also be a 
possibility of the licensee of the block making an out of rounds application to 
obtain the other area into which the field falls. For a discussion of out of round 
applications, see Gordon, supra note 13, paras 4.22–4.23. 
 79. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.27(1). 
 80. Id. Model cl. 27(2). 
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period stated by the Minister, or if, having done so, the Minister is not 
satisfied with the scheme and refuses to accept it, “the Minister may 
himself prepare a development scheme which shall be fair and equitable 
to all licensees.”81 Any licensee who objects to the Minister’s scheme has 
a right to arbitrate.82 
Although the Minister’s power to compel unitization has never been 
used, its existence has led to a significant number of voluntary unitizations 
on the UKCS.83 Given the relatively small size of most new fields within 
at least the mature areas of the UKCS, Unitization and Unit Operating 
Agreements tend to be somewhat simpler than in many other jurisdictions, 
with redetermination rights, for instance, being either tightly 
circumscribed or wholly absent. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing the matter from the standpoint of a regulator wishing to exert 
control over operations,84 consideration of the United Kingdom licensing 
regime reveals a very mixed picture. At least for modern licenses, a 
relatively sound term and relinquishment structure exists that incentivizes 
exploration and—within eight years—requires relinquishment of all parts 
of the licensed area not required for the development of the field. Clear 
and well-designed powers exist to demand additional exploration 
throughout the life of the license and to unitize fields that straddle two or 
more blocks. These powers, although rarely exercised, have given a sound 
legal foundation for Ministerial requests for action. The ability to extend 
licenses—and to seek to negotiate new license terms when so doing—
offers some welcome flexibility and a potential window of opportunity to 
have recalcitrant licensees accept any changes to the license conditions 
that the Minister may think necessary. 
Nevertheless, serious deficiencies also exist. Outside of the particular 
context of unitization of shared oilfields, the Minister’s operational powers 
are directed solely towards the individual license group. Notwithstanding 
licenses that are nearing the end of their lives, change is hard to effect due 
to the contractual aspect of the license, the incorporation of the Model 
Clauses current at the time of the license’s grant, and the lack of 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. Model cl. 27(4). 
 82. Id. Model cl.27(5). 
 83. Warwick English, Unitisation Agreements, in UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS 
AGREEMENTS 97, 100 (Martyn R. David ed., 1997). 
 84. At this stage I express no concluded view on the wisdom of such a 
regulatory intention, but would make two observations. I expect to return to this 
matter in future research when the implementation of the Wood Review is at a 
more advanced stage. 
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mechanisms available to alter the conditions of the license. As a result, 
many existing licenses do not possess the sound term and relinquishment 
structure discussed supra, but instead contain a much looser set of 
obligations. This problem is compounded by the fact that Ministerial 
controls over production are both more tightly circumscribed than those 
over exploration and much less clearly drafted. A clear power to compel 
collaborative working between licensees is absent. Refusal of a field 
development and production program on the basis of “good oilfield 
practice” would seem to be the only lever that the Minister possesses in 
that regard, and it must be doubted if the territorial scope of this term can 
be stretched beyond the licensee’s own field so as to impose an obligation 
to work collaboratively with the licensees of other fields. Moreover, the 
field development and production plans for many licensed areas will 
already have been approved by the Minister, and it is far from clear that 
he may return for a second bite at the cherry. There is some irony in the 
fact that, at the moment when the need to maximize economic recovery 
becomes ever more clear, the clearest power that the regulator possesses 
relative to production is the right to slow it down. And yet that was the 
power that seemed most important in the pioneering days of 1975; that is 
what the government fought and negotiated with the industry to obtain. 
The government is faced with a different set of challenges now. 

